

~~C-ICRIS~~ DOCS

Rostow's meeting 3pm, Oct 26

Italy & Turk missile bases

Negot. strategy

Rostow, Owen, Schatzel, Hayes, Byrns, Beam
Cortada, Hillenbrand, Wallner, Ed Rice, Harold Smith,
Spingarn, Walter Lubman (JH Asst.) Tyler, Southoff

Oct 26: Hammer to Bell, memo on negot. polit. settle.

Proposals for negot. (to get missiles out of bases):

1) Brazil. Res. for denuc. of L.A. with or without Africa.

If this alone is insufficient add:


2) along lines of Defanging Res. (drafted by Cleveland)

agreement of US + USSR not to place nukes (IRBMs, MRBMs,
ICBMs) in treaty of nations other than the two powers.

(This would mean removal of our missiles from
Turkey & Italy but of course leave open UK and all
shipboard missiles). Agreement should only apply to
Europe + ME and not FE confronting China, i.e. India.

Agreement should be put forward not as a trade
over Cuba, but emphasized as a first & important
step toward disarmament.

Disce: Through his various statements and by his actions



11:30 Oct 26

VP, McN, Hel, T, D, AG, ^{Mc}lor, B

B, JH, Postow, M, J

N, Bron Smith

E-P

F-S

Air Stiles scenario Oct 19

R scenario

Oct 25, 5 PM 3:40pm

Three draft analyses of next major move discussed:

a military path, a political path, an intensified
economic path.

SecDef recommended, Pres approved, Planning for a
low-level recon Friday night dropping planes to
obtain photos and produce psycholog. effect.

(On 26th, decision deferred)

C-TH DOCS

1 Oct Analysis of SAM sites Rod Wright

1. Int. Comm. has now identified a total of 15 SAM sites. From the location of these sites, a discernible pattern is developing:

... (near military bases, but...)

Further west in the Pinar del Rio Province a triangular pattern of 3 SA-2 sites cannot be connected with any significant military installation... curiosity is immediately aroused to the purpose of this triang. pattern on the far western tip of Cuba. [SW's 2d ans? Not covered Oct 14?]

3. In the north central portion of the Pinar del Rio Province is a large trapezoidal-shaped restricted area controlled by the Sov military personnel recently introduced into Cuba, measuring 15-20 miles on a side. There are no known military installations in this rough & sparsely populated area.

According to reports from refugees arriving in Miami, all Cubans have been evacuated from this restricted area. Purpose of this restricted area is not currently known.

4. Info concerning deployment of Saw military personnel and "technicians" recently arriving is derived from unevaluated refugee sources, however, an attempt has been made to plot all reported locations to determine whether there is any correlation between the location of Saw personnel & missiles or missile activity. So far, pattern indicates that there is a definite correlation, but significantly the greatest concentration of Saw personnel, activity & camps is in the Western end ... would indicate greater Saw interest in Pinar del Rio than in other provinces.

5.

5. A single unevaluated report states that the Saw "SS-4 Skygaster" missile may have been delivered to Cuba on or about 11 Sept. Some confusion is apparent in this report. The SS-4 is nicknamed "Sandal" while the "Skygaster" is SS-3. This confusion was caused by the interrogators of the source using a recognition manual which designated the SS-4 as the Skygaster. However, the description of the missiles reportedly observed by the source could have applied equally to the Skygaster or the Sandal. Both have essentially the same outward appearance except that the Sandal is about 5 feet longer.

7. Do "operators" have better knowledge of signs of evidence,
or different prior probs and (Kagoff) alarm ~~prob~~ thresholds?
(and motive to exaggerate or influence)?

[Nature of "noise": reasons for distracting reports

1) False alarm rate of particular source; equivocal
as evidence; "disturbances"; could have been generated by
a variety of ~~known~~ ^{circumstances}; fairly almost as probable if
situation ^{assumed} does not obtain as if it does.

2) Existence of contradictory pieces of evidence; hard to
evaluate jointly as evidence; or, of low evidential weight,
together.

3) "Masking" by other hypotheses, of higher initial prob
(Evidence may favor both A + B, and B (false) against other
hyps, but doesn't discriminate between A + B (may even favor
B — even strongly); + B has ^{much} higher prior prob (fr. A may go
up 10-fold, say from $\frac{1}{1000}$ to $\frac{1}{100}$, while for B goes from $\frac{1}{10}$ to
 $\sim 99\%$).

4) Hyp. not considered at trial, for which report would furnish
strong evidence.

5) Equivocality as evidence because of suspected motive of human
source to lie, distort ^{personally} (its influence action). AT EACH STAGE OF
HUMAN "PROCESSING"

6) Knowledge of other pieces of evidence that affects interpretation;
(or, look at the time of other pieces known later).]

In all other respects, including missile carrier, the two appear identical. Source stated that on 12 Sept he had personally seen some 20 such missiles in vicinity of Campo Libertad, a small airfield on western edge of Havana. [Possibly, now?] While this report is still unconfirmed and there are no other reports covering the presence of either SS-3 or SS-4 missiles...

~ the presence of operational SS-4 missiles in this location (restricted area) would give the Soviets a great military asset.

10 Oct: TL-28's identified: first hand witness.

11 Oct: published

19 Oct; DODIA now not less than 8000-9000 low mil. spec. in Cuba.

C-II DOCS

17(?) Oct. footnote to SNIE 11-17-62 para 9+10

DODIA believes

17 Oct draft SNIE 11-17-62

Sovs probably calculated that the US was already inhibited in good part by the large political & military consequences of an overt attack and by hints of Sov intent elsewhere. [The Sovs in their 11 Sept statement and subsequent conversations, have made a connection between Cuba and Berlin. They probably intended that the US, when it discovered missiles in Cuba, should think of Berlin as a Soviet hostage.]

[A plausible guess, and by SO miscalculation.

Could have intended blockade.]

It is possible that the Sovs have been encouraged, by a reading or misreading of US policy statements which suggested to them that the US was very reluctant to use force, to believe that the risks of this course were low. Alternating, and in our view more likely, they have accepted considerable

considerable risks of an important defeat. If so,
the Soviets are evidently prepared to play a dangerous game.
They are gambling that the US can be deterred...

[Contrast to earlier ONE view of Soviets]

"They 'We couldn't have inspired this.' They
couldn't have such contempt for us."

["They won't change." ... "They have changed"]

[DID JFK AGREE?] [WRONG]

7. In either event, however, the USSR must have considered
the possibility that its efforts would fail, and that it
would suffer a decisive defeat in ^{Cuba} Cuba. In risking this
outcome, we believe that the Soviets have probably planned
to respond in ways which would offset as much as is
possible, the loss of a major political asset & the damage
to Sov prestige, but which would not, in their opinion, carry
the risks of ~~SW~~ ^{general war} beyond their control. [SAM, Oct 17]

(Even) if the US limited itself to attacks against the
missile sites and other mil. targets, the USSR would almost
certainly take drastic action against US interests abroad. Such

[D/4: Contd.]

moves would ^{include} similar retaliation against
an overseas US base or bases, action to deny Berlin
to the West and, if this allowed, a diplomatic-political
offensive designed to destroy the whole framework of
US ~~base~~ alliances.

[Was this McG mine?]

[20 Sept: Fidel Castro's pilot: 1 RBMS.

21 Sept: refugee report of ²⁶ SS-4's, seen 12 Sept.

(45 yr old account; trailers 65-70 ft long; saw fins;
sketches numbered SS-4;

8 Oct: report of convey from mail on 17 Sept.

21 Sept: Spanish aircraft pilots of IL-28s.

28 Sept: refugee: Cuba to receive IL-28s. appraisal: 6

5 Oct: report, crates unloaded, IL-28s. (19 Sept)

7 Oct "

1. Mutual surprise.

2. Effect of low prior expectation on: 1) public ^{assertions} predictions
2) commitments
3) planning
4) recon process
5) results of 1) & 2) on
dissemination, evaluation

3. Reasons for low